source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1659/info
EsounD, part of the GNOME desktop environment, is a server process allowing several applications to share the same sound hardware.
Versions of esound up to and including 0.2.19 create a world-writable directory (/tmp/.esd) which is also used to store a domain socket used by esound.
The unix domain socket is also created world-writeable. A race condition exists when this socket is created such that if an attacker creates a symbolic link in the world-writeable /tmp/.esd directory at the right time, the file pointed to by it will be changed to a world-writeable mode. The target file, of course, would have to be owned by the user running ESound. This vulnerability may have to do with a lack of checking return values when binding the address structure to the domain socket before setting permissions on the file, but this is uncomfirmed as are the exact technical details of this vulnerability.
Patches:
--- esd.h.orig Thu Jun 29 23:12:53 2000
+++ esd.h Thu Jun 29 23:12:41 2000
@@ -7,8 +7,15 @@
#endif
/* path and name of the default EsounD domain socket */
+#if 0
#define ESD_UNIX_SOCKET_DIR "/tmp/.esd"
#define ESD_UNIX_SOCKET_NAME ESD_UNIX_SOCKET_DIR ## "/" ## "socket"
+#else
+char *esd_unix_socket_dir(void);
+char *esd_unix_socket_name(void);
+#define ESD_UNIX_SOCKET_DIR esd_unix_socket_dir()
+#define ESD_UNIX_SOCKET_NAME esd_unix_socket_name()
+#endif
/* length of the audio buffer size */
#define ESD_BUF_SIZE (4 * 1024)
--- esd.c.orig Tue Apr 4 11:20:08 2000
+++ esd.c Thu Jun 29 23:34:18 2000
@@ -219,12 +219,12 @@
{
mkdir(ESD_UNIX_SOCKET_DIR,
S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR|
- S_IRGRP|S_IWGRP|S_IXGRP|
- S_IROTH|S_IWOTH|S_IXOTH);
+ S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP|
+ S_IROTH|S_IXOTH);
chmod(ESD_UNIX_SOCKET_DIR,
S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR|
- S_IRGRP|S_IWGRP|S_IXGRP|
- S_IROTH|S_IWOTH|S_IXOTH);
+ S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP|
+ S_IROTH|S_IXOTH);
}
if (access(ESD_UNIX_SOCKET_NAME, R_OK | W_OK) == -1)
{
@@ -317,9 +317,9 @@
/* let anyone access esd's socket - but we have authentication so they */
/* wont get far if they dont have the auth key */
chmod(ESD_UNIX_SOCKET_NAME,
- S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR|
- S_IRGRP|S_IWGRP|S_IXGRP|
- S_IROTH|S_IWOTH|S_IXOTH);
+ S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|
+ S_IRGRP|
+ S_IROTH);
}
if (listen(socket_listen,16)<0)
{
--- esdlib.c.orig Thu Jun 29 23:31:04 2000
+++ esdlib.c Thu Jun 29 23:31:21 2000
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
@@ -1421,4 +1423,34 @@
*/
return close( esd );
+}
+
+char *
+esd_unix_socket_dir(void) {
+ static char *sockdir = NULL, sockdirbuf[PATH_MAX];
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ if (sockdir != NULL)
+ return (sockdir);
+ pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+ if (pw == NULL || pw->pw_dir == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "esd: could not find home directoryn");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ snprintf(sockdirbuf, sizeof(sockdirbuf), "%s/.esd", pw->pw_dir);
+ endpwent();
+ sockdir = sockdirbuf;
+ return (sockdir);
+}
+
+char *
+esd_unix_socket_name(void) {
+ static char *sockname = NULL, socknamebuf[PATH_MAX];
+
+ if (sockname != NULL)
+ return (sockname);
+ snprintf(socknamebuf, sizeof(socknamebuf), "%s/socket",
+ esd_unix_socket_dir());
+ sockname = socknamebuf;
+ return (sockname);
}
While we're there, the build process also uses an insecure tempfile on
non-FreeBSD platforms. Patch:
--- ltmain.sh.orig Thu Jun 29 23:41:49 2000
+++ ltmain.sh Thu Jun 29 23:45:36 2000
@@ -3227,7 +3227,7 @@
outputname=
if test "$fast_install" = no && test -n "$relink_command"; then
if test "$finalize" = yes; then
- outputname="/tmp/$$-$file"
+ outputname=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/$file.XXXXXX") || exit $?
# Replace the output file specification.
relink_command=`$echo "X$relink_command" | $Xsed -e 's%@OUTPUT@%'"$outputname"'%g'`
恐龙抗狼扛1年前0
kankan啊啊啊啊3年前0
66666666666666